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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

'

..........

:.

,.

This is an appeal by the defendant from an order
of the Fourth District Court, directing a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ,and
from the order of the Court denying defendant's
motion to set aside the verdict and judgment and
enter judgment for the defendant or in the alternative to grant a new trial on the merits, and from the
further order of the Court, granting to the plaintiff
a new trial on the issue of damages only.
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It should be observed here that two sets of numbering are employed in the record on appeal as prepared by the Clerk of the District Court. The pleadings :and other papers not part of the transcript of
testimony are numbered from 1 to 55 inclusive and
in his brief we shall refer to this portion of the
record by the designation "R". The transcript of
testimony is separately numbered from pages 1 to
343 inclusive, and in referring to this portion of the
record we shall designate it as "Tr.". We shall refer
to the parties as they were designated in the Court
below.

THE FACTS
The following facts out of which this case arises,
are established without serious dispute:
The plaintiff, Marion 0. Wright, resided near
the northerly outskirts but within the cor1>orate limits
of the City of Orem. (Tr. 106). His home was on
the east side of Highway ·91, just north of a slight
bend in Highway 91. Highway 91 was at that time
a two-lane highway. (Tr. 7, 45, 80, 107). · Immediately
north of plaintiff's home was a garage owned and
operated by the plaintiff and referred to in the record
as Wright's Garage. (Tr. 4, 106). Two separate driveways lead from Higpway 91 easterly. One of the
driveways leads to Mr. Wright's home, the other driveway leads into the garage. (Tr. 107-108). The exact
distance between driveways does not •appear m
· the
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record. The distance between "\Y right's Garage and
the curYe to the south wa~ variously estiinated by the
witnesses at from 250 to 400 feet. (Tr. 47, 57, 83, 92,
148, 238).
At the time of the accident here involved, which
was on January 14, 1949, the pl:aintiff had in his
employ, as an assistant, one Walter J. Mitchell. (Tr.
4, 109). The regular hours of operation of Wright's
Garage were from 9:00 A.ni. to 6:00 P.l\L (Tr. 4, 109).
At the conclusion of the working day and shortly
after 6:00 P.l\I., on January 14, 1949, the garage had
been locked (Tr. 5, 109), and Mr. Mitchell was preparing to drive the plaintiff to a parts house in Orem,
for the purpose of obtaining a part which was needed
for the next day's work. (Tr. 34, 110). Mr. Mitchell
owned his own automobile, which was a 1938 Ford
and which was a light gray or tan in color. (Tr. 6.
44, 101, 111, 149, 205). The car was ,parked in the
driveway leading to the Wright home. Mr. Mitchell
backed his automobile out of the driveway, and onto
Highway 91. (Tr. 10, 29). Just how far the automobile
was backed onto Highway 91 is a matter concerning
which there is a sharp dispute in the evidence, and
which we will more particularly discuss hereafter in
this brief. When Mitchell got the car on the road,
the automobile flooded out or stalled. (Tr. 29, 37).
At about the same time, the lights on the Mitchell
automobile also went out. (Tr. 37). The plaintiff
came from his house, out to the road where the
:Mitchell car was stalled and told Mitchell to get the
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
car off the road. (Tr. 11, 126, 136). Both Mitchell
and the plaintiff realized that the car was in ~a dangerous situation where it was stalled. (Tr. 39, 40, 132).
The defendant, Theron W. Maynard, was driving
his Dodge automobile in ~a northerly direction along
Highway 91, through the City of Orem and toward
Salt Lake City. He had with him as passengers,
his wife, Mr. and Mrs. Raymond Klauck, and Mr.
and Mrs. M. W. Wiscomb. (Tr. 146, 165, 232, 258,
274, 283, 293). After the Maynard car came around
the bend or curve to the South of the Wright Garage,
the Mitchell automobile suddenly "loomed up" before
them. (Tr. 276). At the time the Mitchell automobile
was first observed, the plaintiff, wearing white coveralls (Tr. 91, 142, 261, 287, 295), was discovered standing at the right or south side of the Mitchell automobile facing southerly in the direction from which
the defendant-'s ~automobile was approaching and waving his arms. (Tr. 151, 176, 234, 260, 276, 284, 287,
291, 295). The defendant applied his brakes but when
it appeared that he might not be able to stop in time
to avoid a collision, he turned to the right, so as to
pass in front of the Mitchell automobile. As the
defendant's car neared the ,position where the plaintiff was standing, the plaintiff ran, or jumped directly
in front of the defendant's automobile which collided
with him. (Tr. 40, 152, 185, 261, 276, 295). As a result
of the collision aforesaid, the plaintiff sustained perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sonal injuries, the details of which need not be related
here.
The defendant's automobile came to rest in a
snowbank, a short distance past the point of impact.
The plaintiff was discovered lying in the snow bank
to the right of the defendant's vehicle with one foot
just under the right running board. (Tr. 30, 41, 60, 153,
154, 186, 263, 271, 272, 295).
The Maynard automobile was not observed by
either :Mitchell or the p1aintiff until it was only a
short distance from the Mitchell automobile, notwithstanding the fact that there was an unobstructed
view to the south for a distance of several hundred
feet. Mitchell testified that he first saw the Maynard
ear when it was nearly on top of him. (Tr. 40). The
plaintiff testified that the Maynard car was clear off
the paved portion of the highway when it was first
observed by him (Tr. 116), and about 50 to 60 feet
away. (Tr. 133). In view of the testimony of the
investigating officers that the distance travelled by
the Maynard vehicle from the time it first left the
paved portion of Highway 91, to the time it came to
rest in the snowbank, north of the point of impact
was only 52 feet (Tr. 209, 210, 225), it is apparent
that the Maynard car could not have been more than
25 or 30 feet away from the plaintiff when it was
first observed by him.
It is clear from the testimony of all of the eye
witnesses to the accident, that the plaintiff ran directly
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into the poath of the Maynard automobile. The testimony of Mitchell was as follows (Tr. 40, 41):

"'Q. And that was while :Mr. Wright was
t:;ignaling ?
1

''A.

Yes.

"Q. And he was clear off the h'1ghway at
that time~
''A.

Yes.

"Q. And then Mr. Wright ran to the front
of your car, didn't he?
''A. Yes.
"Q. Right into the path of Mr. M1aynard's
auton1obile?
''A. Yes.
"Q. And if Mr. Wright had stayed where
he was he wouldn't have been hit, would he?
".MR. McCuLLOUGH: Object to it on the
ground it is problematical, immaterial, irrelevant.

''MR. CHRISTENSEN: I will withdraw it.

'' Q. Mr. Maynard's ear didn't strike your
car at all, did it?

"A. No. Not that I know of."
The testimony of the plaintiff was as follows
(Tr. 116):
'' Q. You turned around.
did you face ?

''A.

Which direction

Turned around and faced the south.
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•· Q. F·acing this on-coming autOino:bile f
•· A. Yes. And the first thing that entered
1ny n1ind was that he was going to hit me against
the side of this car. So . I took off. That's
all I remember.
•'Q. Which way did you go f
'' ~\.. Brother, I took off. I took off for
the snowbank on the east side of the road,
towards my house.

'' Q. Did you observe where the ~Iaynard
car was traveling in relation to the concrete
highway'?
"A. It was clear off of the highway the only
time I saw it.
"Q. And that's off which
"A.

That's

off

east

of

direction~

the

highwa.y."

(Italics added.)
The testimony of the defendant was as follows
(Tr. 152):
''A. I had to make a mental decision on
what to do. There was traffic coming from the
north. I couldn't go to the left without crashing head-on. I had five passengers in my car
to consider besides the man standing at the
side of the car. I applied my brakes and my
car slid directly at the stalled car. And I felt
that if I continued in that course I would pin
that man between the two cars, between the
front end of my car and the side of the stalled
automobile. So I pulled my car to the right,
and played my brakes, to give me some tracSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion to get to the right of the stalled automobile, and my car took hold, and I went to
the right.

'' Q. When you say your car took hold,
what do you mean by that?
''A. The steering apparatus took hold, and
I veered to the right and avoided hitting the
car broadside.

"Q.
time?

Now did anything else happen at that

"A. At about-at the point I got to, almost
to th(J;.t automobile, I had pulled to the right,
and was avoiding it, Mr. Wright broke from in
front of it and jumped right in front of my
automobile.

"Q. Did your automobile strike Mr. Wright¥
"A.

My automobile struck Mr. Wright."

(Italics added.)
Mr. Maynard also testified on cross-examination
as follows {Tr. 185) :

'' Q. Then you continued on past the point
where you say that you struck Mr.-did you
see Mr. Wright when you hit him~
"A. When he lunged in front of me, I
definitely hollered as loud as I could, 'No,
no, no,' just before the point of impact.
'' Q. How far were you away then, when
you hollered, 'No, no, no'~

''A. I was practically to the car, and he
dashed in front of me, as I hollered it out.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'• Q. In other words, he ran over toward
the side of the road?

''A.

That's right, from his position.

"Q. And you caught him approximately how
far east of the Ford automobile, how far had he'' A. Oh, perhaps two or three feet, of the
front end of the Ford automobile."
The testimony of Mrs. Amy Kl·auck was as follows (Tr. 261):
''A. \Yell, all I can say, ·we tried to turn,
but the gentleman objected.
'' Q. Well, the Court overruled him on that.
You may answer it.

''A. Tried to turn. There was on-coming
traffic from the north, and had we turned in
the usual left hand to pass, trying to get around
that, we would have hit the on-coming traffic,
so he turned to the left. As we got to the car"Q.

Just a moment-

,, A. Or to the right, I beg your pardon.
We turned to the right. And as we got to the
car, this man jumped in front of us.. '' (Italics
added.)
The testimony of Mrs. Maynard was as follows
(Tr. 276):
''A. We didn't go to the left. There was
traffic coming, so we turned to the right. And
just as we got in-just before we went in front
of the car, Mr. 'Wright jumped in front of us."
(Italics ·added.)
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The lights of the defendant's automobile were on
lo\v beam at the time the accident occured. (Tr. 298,
309).

'
J

I

I

No specific testimony was adduced on behalf of
the plaintiff with respect to the speed of the Maynard
automobile. The passengers in the Maynard automobile estimated his speed from 20 to 35 miles per
hour at the time the plaintiff was first observed, with
most of them fixing the speed from 25 to 30 miles
per hour. (Tr. 173, 249, 259, 275, 284, 298). They
estimated the speed at the time the Maynard car
came into contact with the snowbank at 8 to 10 miles
per hour. (Tr. 248).
It is undisputed that the Maynard car came to
rest in ,a snowbank in such fashion that the front
and right side of the car were embedded in the snow.
Witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff testified that the
car was completely into the snowbank, except for the"
left wheel. (Tr. 41, 55, 79, 96). Witnesses on behalf

of the defendant testified that the left side of the
car and the rear wheels were entirely free of the
snowbank. (Tr. 153, 155, 208, 222).
Byron Jensen testified that on June 8, 1949, he
examined the lights of defendant's ear for purposes
of the state inspection law and found them to be in
good order and in compliance ·with state requirements. (Tr. 254). A foundation for his testimony
was laid by testimony of the defendant, that his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lights had not been adjusted, replaced or repaired
between January 14, and June 8, 1949. (Tr. 163).
~\~ to mo~t of the other facts in the case, there
is a Yt>n· sharp dispute in the evidence. With respect
to the width of the road, the plaintiff and certain
witnes:se~ called on his behalf testified that the main
portion of the road was :27 feet ·wide with an additional
four-foot paved shoulder on each side, making an
overall width of 35 feet. (Tr. 107). The pl·aintiff
and the w·itnesses who testified on his behalf also
testified that the shoulder of the road had been cleared
to a distance of 12 to 15 feet east of the easterly edge
of the paved portion of the highway. (Tr. 80, 93, 118).
There is no dispute that .there was a large snowbank
running along the east edge of the road approximately
3 to 3lf2 feet high and some distance east of the ea3t
edge of the paved portion of the road.

Officers Evans and Ingersoll, members of the State
Highway Patrol, who had investigated the accident,
were called and testified on the part of the defendant.
They stated that hy actual measurement the width
of the paved portion of the road was 27 feet including
the four-foot shoulders. (Tr. 207, 210, 214, 215, 219, 223).
They estimated that the dist·ance at the side of the
road cleared of snow at 10 to 12 feet. (Tr. 210, 215,
216, 218, 224). Klauck estimated the cleared distance
at 7 to 8 feet. (Tr. 305).
There is also a sharp dispute in the evidence as
to the condition of the road at the time of the acciSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dent. The witnesses called on behalf of the plaintiff
testified that the highway was either dry, or damp,
or wet. They all testified that there was no ice on
Highway 91 or that if there was it was merely splotchy
and that generally the road was free of ice and hard
packed snow. They also testified that the weather
was warm and thawing and that there was slush at
the sides of the road. (Tr. 33, 47, 60, 65, 67, 72, 98, 117,
135). To the contrary, all of the occupants of the
Maynard vehicle as well as both of the patrolmen who
investigated the accident, testified very clearly and
positively that the roads were entirely covered with
'a sheet of glare ice and that they were extremely
slick and slippery. (Tr. 147, 167, 209, 219, 222, 223, 224,
227, 229, 232, 237, 259, 260, 265, 275, 280, 283, 284, 285,
293, 300, 301).
There is likewise a sharp dispute in the evidence
as· to how far the Mitchell vehicle extended into Highway 91 from the driveway leading into the plaintiff's
home. The witnesses for the plaintiff who testified
to this fact, fixed the position of the Mitchell car at
somewhere near the east edge of the paved portion
of the road. Mitchell testified that the rear wheels
were just over the east edge of the paved portion of
the highway. (Tr. 10, 38). The plaintiff testified that
the rear bumper of the Mitchell car was about even
with the west edge of the four-foot paved shoulder of
Highway 91. ( Tr. 10, 38, 45, 90, 114, 115). Contrariwise, all the occupants of the Maynard automobile,
testified that the Mitchell automobile was squarely
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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astride the right hand or northbound driving lane of
Highway 91, con1pletely blocking passage to northbound traffic. ( Tr. 150, 233, 260, 283, 295).
It should be o:bserved here that it was stipulated
by counsel for the plaintiff that the length of the
Mitehell vehicle was approximately 15 feet. (Tr. 131).
There is no dispute that the lVIaynard automobile
passed between the front end of the Mitchell automobile and the snowbank to the east of Highway 91.
The left rear fender of the Maynard automobile scraped
against the bumper of the Mitchell automobile in passing in front of it. Otherwise, there was no contact
between the two vehicles. (Tr. 41, 131-132). Of nece8sity therefore, there must have been a space of at
least 6 to 8 feet between the front end of the Mitchell
automobile and the snowbank. Assuming a minimum
distance of 6 feet between ·the front bumper of the
Mitchell car and the snowbank, and assuming the
length of the Mitchell automobile to be 15 feet, the
rear end of the Mitchell automobile must have been
at least 21 feet west of the snowbank, which would
mean that it would have to protrude substantially into
the paved portion of Highway 91.
It should also be observed that there is a conflict in the evidence as to whether there was oncoming traffic from the north at the time the collision
occurred. Both the plaintiff and Mitchell testified that
they looked to the north immediately prior to the
accident and that there was no traffic approaching
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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north at that time. (Tr. 32, 115, 135). Howdefendant, and several passengers in his car,
definitely that there was on-coming traffic
north. (Tr. 149, 162, 261, 275, 276, 294, 298).

The defendant also testified that the plaintiff had
stated to him that he, the plaintiff, did not hold him,
the defendant, in any way responsible for the accident.
Mr. Reese James \Villiams, who was a patient in the
same room in the hos-pital as the plaintiff, testified
to a similar statement made by the plaintiff. (Tr. 161,
201, 202). This testimony was of course denied by
the plaintiff. (Tr. 328). The statement purportedly
made by the plaintiff, as testified to by the defendant
and by Williams, could have been believed by the
jury as being an admission on the part of wright
that he realized that the def.endant had done everything possible to avert the accident and/or that Wright
himself was at fault in having jumped in front of
the defendant's automobile at the last moment.
There is abundant evidence in the record from
which a jury could find that the defendant was traveling at a speed of about 25 to 30 miles per hour; that
he discovered the plaintiff standing in front of the
Mitchell vehicle squarely astride his path of travel;
that at the time the plaintiff was first discovered, he
was waving his arms up and down; that the defendant
fearing that it would he impossible to bring his car
to a complete stop in order to avoid crushing the
plaintiff against the· Mitchell automobile and being
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

I

J

1

l

I

J

I

I
I

I
(

'

15

unable to turn to the left because of approachingtraffic from the north, turned his car to the rig-ht;
that the accident would have been completely averted
had not the plaintiff at the last mOinent jumped directly
into the pathway of the :Maynard automobile. (Tr.
13:2. 153).
Fron1 this evidence the jury might have concluded
that the defendant was in the exE;rcise of reasonable
care and did everything possible to avoid the accident;
that the plaintiff negligently placed himself in a position ·which exposed himself unnecessarily to the perils
of vehicular traffic on the highway; that the plaintiff
failed to keep a proper, or any lookout for other
v;ehides on the highway; and that by reason thereof
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which
was the proximate cause of the accident; or that the
accident in view of all the facts and circumstances
was unavoidable.
At the conclusion of the trial, both parties made
motions for directed verdicts. (Tr. 335, 336, 337). The
motion of the defendant was summarily denied. After
argument, the motion of the plaintiff was granted.
The jury returned a verdict, pursuant to the direction
of the Court, in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of
$1,004.44. (R. 44). It is very interesting to observe
that the jury allowed the plaintiff only $480.00 for
general damages, and that all the items of special
damages claimed by the plaintiff were cut squarely
in half by the jury although there was no dispute in
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the evidence as to most of the items of special damages claimed by the plaintiff. (R. 44). This to our
mind is a very striking demonstration that the jury
regarded the case as one of no liability and would
have returned a verdict of no cause of action in favor
of the defendant had the case been submitted to the
jury on its merits. We believe that this factor is
entitled to strong consi~eration by the Court, since
the jury was present at the trial and had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses upon
the stand. It is quite apparent from the jury's verdict,
that the jury did not believe that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover on the evidence presented in Court.

POINTS TO BE ARGUED
I. THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT GUILTY OF
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
c

A. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS TRAVELING AT
SUCH A RATE OF SPEED THAT HE COULD NOT STOP
HIS AUTOMOBILE WITHIN THE DISTANCE ILLUMINATED BY HIS HEADLIGHTS.
B. THE DOCTRINE OF DALLEY vs. MIDWESTERN
DAIRY PRODUCTS CO., IS NO LONGER THE LAW OF
THE STATE.
C. EVEN IF THE DOCTRINE OF THE DALLEY CASE
IS STILL THE LAW OF THIS STATE, IT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
II. EVEN IF THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT
IN OVER-DRIVING HIS LIGHTS, SUCH NEGLIGENCE
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WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.
III. THE ACCIDENT WAS SOLELY AND PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE
PLAINTIFF OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE THERE WAS
EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE JURY COULD FIND THE
PLAINTIFF GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
IV. THE JURY COULD HAVE FOUND THAT THIS
WAS AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT, NOT CHARGEABLE
TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF EITHER PARTY TO THIS
ACTION.

I. THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT GUILTY OF
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS TRAVELING AT
SUCH A RATE OF SPEED THAT HE COULD NOT STOP
HIS AUTOMOBILE WITHIN THE DISTANCE ILLUMINATED BY HIS HEADLIGHTS.

It is apparent from the holding of the .Court that
the Court must have concluded that the only possible
finding from the evidence was that the defendant was
traveling at such a high rate of speed that he could
not bring his car to a stop within the distance illuminated by his headlights, and was therefore guilty of
negligence as a matter of law under the rule of Dalley
vs. Midwestern Dairy Products Co. It is our position that the evidence is not conclusive on this question.

.,:
\

It is clear from the testimony of the defendant
and the passengers in his car, that no all out effort

..
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was made by the defendant to bring his car to a
complete stop. He did apply his brakes but ·when it
became apparent to him that it was doubtful whether
he could stop his car before striking the plaintiff or
the :\litchell automobile, he released the pressure on
his brakes in order to get better traction, and turned
his automobile to the right to avoid striking the
Mitchell vehicle.

'

I
I

j

In other words, rather than run the risk of not
being able to stop by reason of the icy condition of
the road, defendant adopted what appeared to him to
be the safer course of action, which was to turn out
and around the Mitchell vehicle. In order to accomplish this it was necessary that he release the brakes
in order to obtain the necessary traction. It is quite
possible that if the defendant had persisted in his
efforts to stop the automobile he might have been
successful in so doing. Whether or not he would have
been able to do so, is a fact that can never be definitely
known, but must forever remain within the field of
speculation.
It appears to us that it would be a monstrous
proposition of law which would require an operator
in the position of Mr. Maynard to apply his brakes
full force when a better method of averting the accident appeared to be open. Mr. Maynard might have
continued with full application of his brakes and might
have successfully averted the accident completely. On
the other hand, he might not have been able to avert
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the accident and crashed into the :Mitchell car. Which
would haYe been the result, can never be known. The
latter alternative would have involved the potentiality
not only of more seriously injuring the plaintiff, but
also any occupants in the Mitchell automobile as well
as all the passengers in the defendant's automobile.
Under these circurnstances, the most that could possibly be said for the plaintiff's case would he that
,,-hether or not the defendant was overdriving his
lights would be for the jury. The more logical view
wo-:1ld be to say that there was no way to prove this
fact,- that it was too highly speculative to qe submitted to the jury, and therefore the plaintiff had
failed to carry his burden of proof on the question
of negligence.
\V e think that the jury might well have found,
and in all probability would have found that the
defendant did all that due care requir.ed, and even
more, to avert this a·ccident. We are at a loss to
understand how the Court could possibly hold, as a
matter of law that the defendant was negligent.
B. THE DOCTRINE OF DALLEY vs. MIDWESTERN
DAIRY PRODUCTS CO., IS NO LONGER THE LAW OF
THE STATE.

We have heretofore pointed out that the evidence
does not establish as a matter of law that the defendant was overdriving his lights. However, admitting for
purposes of argument only, that the evidence was
conclusive on this point, we are still of the opinion
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that such was not negligence as a matter of law, but
that it was a question for the jury whether, in view of
all of the facts and circumstances, defendant was
guilty of negligence.
It was strenuously argued to the Court in behalf
of the defendant, that the harsh doctrine of Dalley
vs. Midwestern Dairy Products Company, 80 Ut. 331,
15 Pac. (2d) 309, no longer prevails in this state, and
that the question of negligence on the part of the
defendant was for the jury.
The Dalley case was decided by a three-to-two
decision of the Court. Mr. Justice Straup wrote a
vigorous dissenting opinion in which he said:
''That the plaintiff unexpectedly and without
notice or warning encountered a dangerous obstruction in the highway without lights or signals
and created hy the negligence and unlawful act
of the defendant, admits of no controversy. He
testified that with proper headlights, driving his
automobile at about 25 miles an hour, and observing a careful lookout, he did not discover
the truck until about 20 feet away. Such distance
and rate of speed were given only as estimates."

* * *
"However, let it be conceded that the duty
imposed on automobile drivers is as stated in
such cases and in some other cases cited in the
prevailing opinion, still whether the plaintiff
failed or omitted to comply with such requirements is, on the record and so generally on a
given state of facts, a question for the jury; and
because a driver in the nighttime drove against
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or collided with a substantial object unlawfully
left or placed on a public highway without lights
or other signals to give warning of its existence,
does not so conclusively speak the failure or
omission of the performance of such duty, or
the want of ordinary care on the part of the
driYer in the operation of the automobile, as
to justify as matter of law the rejection of
testimony as being false and unworthy of belief
that the duty imposed was performed and due
care exercised.''
Since that decision, this Court has criticised the
doctrine of the Dalley case on nearly every nccasion
that the same question has come before the 'Court.
In some of the more recent decisions the doctrine has
been substantially modified and its harsh operation
greatly alleviated.
In Hansen v. Clyde, et al., 89 Utah 31, 56 Pac.
(2d) 1366, the decision was criticised by Mr. Justice
Wolfe, in a dissenting opinion where he said:
''In the Dalley case a truck was left across
the highway without lights. When the point
decided in that case directly comes hefore this
court in some future case, I hope to pay my
respects to it. At this time, I shall only say
that I hope some rule more nearly comporting
with the realities of travel, although perhaps
not so logical, may be worked out whereby one
who endangers travel by deliberately and wrongfully placing a dangerous obstacle in the path
of that travel may not go scot-free because the
traveler is in law required to see it. I think
the traveler should be given the benefit of some
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presumption that others have not wrongfully
obstructed the highway.''
In the san1e opinion, :Mr. Justice \Volfe enumerated a number of hypothetical fact situations and
stated what he considered should be the law applicable
to each of the situations. The ninth situation discussed
by Justice \Volfe, seems to fit the facts of this case.
Mr. Justice \Volfe said:
"Ninth. Those cases where it is claimed
there was a concurrence of two or more active
negligences, but one or the other or all consisted, not of the basic act itself, but of the
manner of doing the act or omitting to do some
incidental act which is claimed should have
attended the basic act, and, which, if done,
would have avoided the effect of another's
negligence. This class is illustrated by those
situations where someone traverses the right
of way of another but it is claimed that the
other was going too fast or failed to sound a
warning and a guest passenger or other third
party was injured. The basic act of traveling
on one's right of way was not negligence. It
was the overspeed or failure to give warning
which it was claimed was negligence. The reason
such situations may be put in a separate class
is because they constitute cases where there is
really an attempt to thrust on one party the
duty to avoid the effects of the negligence of
another and yet which do not fall under any
situation where the last clear chance doctrine
is applicable. The act or omission claimed to
be negligence is not such in the sense that it
operated on another agency in the relationship
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of ean8P and effect to cause an <H_'(·ident but
' of
that. if it had not been present the ~·ffect
the other '8 negligenee ·would have lwen avoided
and the accident thus prevented. Where the
aet of the party putting hin1self in danger was
deliberate or he had eYery chance himself to
avoid it as distinguished · from the situation
where eYerything came quickly, it will generally
be found that the cases have held that the other
party's so-called negligence did not contribute
to the accident. Haarstrich v. Oregon Short L.
R. Co., 70 Utah, 552, 262, P. 100. And the
cases have divided on the question as to whether
a motorist's overspeed in his own right of way
can in law be held to haye contributed to an
accident caused by another assuming the right
of \Yay~ One line of decisions holds that in such
case the speeding had nothing to do with the
accident, and that, while a person speeding
over the course in which he had prior right
of -..,·ay may have been negligence, yet all that
must be taken into consideration by one who
wrongfully assumes the right of way and that
the placing of himself across the course and
not the speeding was the sole cause of the accident.' * * * I have attempted to point out
at least in the case where the one committing
the paramount negligence had ample opportunity
to avoid it himself, such as where there was
a clear lookout, but he deHberately rode into
the line of danger, the negligence of the other,
if any, is too remote."
In the case of Nielsen v. TVatanabe (Utah), 62
Pac. (2d) 117, this Court made a definite departure
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or engrafted a definite qualification on the Dalley
case. The Court, speaking through Justice Elias
Hanson said :
''If the truck could not, because of some
obstruction, be seen as plaintiff and her husband approached it prior to the time they were
blinded, and if plaintiff's husband was driving
at a lawful rate of speed an automobile properly equipped with lights and brakes without
any reason to believe the headlights of another
automobile would suddenly and unexpectedly
blind him, that while so blinded the collision
occurred 'without time for him to reduce his
speed or stop his automobile, the rule announced
in the cases relied upon by defendant and heretofore cited in this opinion would not apply.
Under such circumstances it may not be said
that plaintiff's husband was, as a matter of
law, guilty of contributory negligence. 3-4
Huddy Cyclopedia of Automobile Law (9th Ed.)
p. 59, No. 30 and cases there cited.''
This court departed further from the doctrine in
the case of Moss v.. Christensen-Gardner, Inc. (Utah},
98 Pac. (2d) 363. The Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice McDonough and referring to the Dalley case
said:
''While this rule is recognized generally in
other jurisdictions as well as in our own, it
is certainly not a rule without limitation or
restriction. Nor does it have universal appli,cation. ''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I
I

~,

I
I

f

I
J

The Court then went on to discuss other cases
which had refused to follow the strict and harsh
doctrine of the Dalley case :
.. In the case of Riner Y. Collins, 132 Kan.
613, 296 P. 713, 714, the Supre1ne Court of Kansas had before it the identical problem presented in the present case. The petition in the
Kansas case alleged that on a dark night plaintiff while driving along the highway ran into
defendant's truck which had been left standing
on the highway without any lights or other
signal to warn drivers of approaching vehicles.
Defendant demurred on the ground that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and
the collision was not caused by defendant's
negligence. The argument advanced in support
of the demurrer was that the law required the
plaintiff to drive according to his ability to see
and that plaintiff must have been negligent or
he would have seen the truck in time to avoid
striking it. The court held the complaint sufficient, stating that not only did the petition
allege due care on plaintiff's part, it also
described defendant's negligence as such that
motorists in plaintiff's situation could not, in
the exercise of due care, see the truck in time
to avoid collision. Further, it was specifically
alleged that the accident was caused by defendant's negligence.
''See also, as to the rule under discussion
Indianapolis Glove Co. v. Fenton, 89 Ind. App.
173, 166 N.E. 12; General Exchange Ins. Corporation v. M. Romano & Son (La. App.), 190
So. 168; Chapman v. Ind. Laundry Co., 38 Ga.
App. 424, 144 S.E. 127; McKeon v. Delbridge,
55 S.D. 579, 226 N.E. 947, '67 A.L.R. 311; Vol. 9
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Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law &_Practice, Permanent Edition, page 193, ~ o. 5966. ''
In a f-;pecial concurring opinion in that case, 1\lr.
Justice \Volfe pointed out Yery specifically that the
decision \\·as a departure from the logic of the Dalley
case. He said:

I

1
J

''The instant decision commendably departs
from the seYere logic of the Dalley case in order
to make the law comport not with logic but
with 1~ealities-a very welcome symptom. The
logic of the Dalley case would require that a
driYer blinded by lights stop until the blindness
disappear. There is in logic no more reason
why a man should proceed when unable to see
objects because of being blinded by the lights
of some other car than when unable to see them
by the lights of his own car. But as stated in
my dissenting opinion in Farrell v. Cameron
supra, some concession must be made to actualities. In that case the implication was that
a man on his own side of the road blinded by
oncoming lights was under duty to discover an
oncoming person on the wrong side of the road.
Of course, such law should make driving at
night on such used arterials practically an
impossibility.''
Mr. Justice Larson dissented. He also recognized
that the case departed from the doctrine of the Dalley
case. Justice Larson took the position that if the
Court was going to pay lip service to the Dalley case,
that "it should follow its logic. Since the Court refused
to specifically overrule the Dalley case, Judge Larson
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took the position that it \Hls neces~ary to dissent in
order to consistently follow the law. Justice Larson
said:
''The atternpt to dra '" such fine distinctions
in the case of ~ ielsen Y. \\' atanabe, 90 Utah
40, 62 P. 2d 117, and in the case at bar, seems
to be a recognition that the rule in the Dalley
case is not sound and therefore should be avoided, even though it requires super refinements
in reasoning and hairsplitting in logic. I think
the Dalley case should be overruled, or the doctrine thereof modified so as to make possible
a realistic approach to the problem. * * * But
when one is unlawfully upon the highway, is
making an unla·wful use of the highway, he
should not be permitted to impose upon another
making a lawful use thereof the duty of protecting him in his unlawful use. To a wrong·doer, the driver owes only the duty of not wilfully injuring him or his property. Since the
wrongdoer is not lawfully upon the highway
the driver is not charged with anticipating his
presence there and is not impressed with the
duty of protecting him to the same extent as
he owes to one making lawful use of the highway. Such wrongdoer should therefore not be
able to escape his liability by saying that the
driver did not exercise toward him the same
degree of care that is imposed for the protection
of one lawfully upon the highway.'' (Italics
added.)
a~

The decision rn Trimble, et

'UX

v. Union Pacific

Stages, et al.- (Utah), 142 Pa.c. (2d) 674, made a com-

plete break from the doctrine of the Dalley case. The
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facts of that case are generically similar to those in
the case at bar. In that case, the defendant's driver
suffered an impairment of vision by reason of a
foggy condition existing on the highway. In the
instant case, the defendant was subject to a severe
visual limitation by reason of the white coveralls worn
by the plaintiff and the tendency to ·blend in color
with the sno,vy background and the light colored automobile. In that case the Court specifically refused to
follow the doctrine of the Dalley case and set forth a
number of exceptions to the doctrine of that case.
Speaking through Mr. Justice Larson, the Court said:
''Appellant cites Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy
Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P. (2d) 309 and
Hansen v. Clyde, 89 Utah 31, 56 P. (2d) 1366,
104 A.L.R. 943 in support of the contention
that the court should have instructed that as a
matter of law defendant was guilty of negligence. These cases lay down the rule that it
is· the duty of a driver of a motor vehicle moving along the highway at night to so drive his
vehicle that he can stop before colliding with
any object within the range of his headlights.
And further, if the lights with which the vehicle
is equipped are not up to the standard set by
law, the driver must reduce his speed proportionately. Failure to observe this standard of
care is negligence as a matter of law. This is
the rule of law that we are asked to apply in
the case at "bar. Appellant argues that since
defendant's bus was moving at such a speed
after entering the fog that it could not be
stopped within the driver's range of vision, the
driver, and his principals, the defendants were
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guilty of negligence as a matter of law. Thus
in effect appellants ask this court to say that
one driving· on a highway at night is bound
to anticipate that there will be fog, smoke, or
some other obstruction which will reduce the
driver's vision, and that therefore all must
drive at such speed that should they meet with
such an obstruction they can stop their automobile within the range of their vision as it is
limited by this obstruction. We do not believe
this to be the correct rule of law, or the situation to which the rule laid down in the Dalley
case, supra, was intended to apply. In Nielsen
v. Watanabe, 90 Utah 401, 62 P. 2d 117, 119,
there was a situation similar to the one in this
case. There while the driver of the plaintiff's
car was suddenly and unex'Pectedly blinded by
the lights of approaching automobiles, or during the brief period of blindness which it is
commonly known follows exposure to bright
lights, the collision occurred, plaintiff running
into a truck parked on the highway, without a
taillight burning. This court there said: 'If the
truck could not, because of some obstruction,
be seen as plaintiff and her husband approached
it prior to the time they were blinded, and if
plaintiff's husband was driving at a lawful
rate of speed an automobile properly equipped
with lights and brakes without any reason to
believe the headlights of another autome>bile
would suddenly or une~pectedly iblind him, that
while so blinded the ·collision occurred without
time for him to reduce his speed or stop his
automobile, the rule announced in the cases
relied upon by defendant and heretofore cited
in this opinion (the Dalley case, and others
laying down the same rule) would not apply.
Under such circumstances it may not be said
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that the plaintiff's husband was, as a matter
of law, guilty of contributory negligence.' Citing 4 Huddy Cyc. of Auto. Law, 9th Ed.; p. 50.
And in l\ioss v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 98
Utah 253, 98 P. 2d, 363, 365 : 'Indeed the allegations that because of the glare of the headliglits
of the other car 'it ·was impossible, in the
exercise of reasonable care, for plaintiff to see
said unlighted and unmarked ~barricade * * *
in time to safely avoid 'running upon the same'
would seem to be equivalent to alleging that
at the point where she could have, in the
exercise of due ·care, seen the barricade, she
V{as blinded by the glare of such headlights;
and the blinding light having passed, there
was not sufficient distance between her and
the barricade to have brought her car to a stop.'
The court then goes on to hold that since the
complaint by the above allegation does not show
that plaintiff was, 'as a matter of law, guilty
of contributory negligence', the demurrer thereto
should not have been sustained. Other courts
have passed on this question and in the following circumstances, said that there was no negligence as a matter of law: Vision obscured by
dust raised suddenly by passing automobile
(Johnson v. Prideaux, 176 Wis. 375, 187 N.W.
207; Murphy v. Hawthorne, 117 Or. 319, 244
P. 79, 44 A.L.R. 1397; Melton v. Manning, Tex.
Civ. App., 216 S.W. 488) ; sudden failure of headlights (Mueller v. State Auto Ins. Ass 'n, 223
Iowa 888, 274 N.W. 106); blinded by the lights
of approaching automobiles (Kadlec v. Al Johnson Const. Co., 217 Iowa 299, 252 N.W. 103,
Salenme v. Mulloy, 99 Conn. 474, 121 A. 870);
when accident occurred on dark rainy day, and
headlights of oncoming traffic blinded driver
(I{irby v. Sweif & Co., 199 Ark. 442, 134 S.W.
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~d 863) ; forced off the road by approaching
aut01nobile, and when the ''weather was inclement, dark, misty and it was raining" (Fleming
v. Hartrick, 100 \Y. Ya. 714, 131 S.E. 558);
and when there ·was fog on the road, both when
it ,,~as a heaYy fog occurring all along the road
and when there were spots or zones of fog (Lindquist v. Schn1idt, 289 Ill. App. 614, 7 N.E. 2d
501; ~ elson v. Inland l\1otor Freight Co., 60
Idaho 443, 9:2 P. 2d 790; Renaud v. New England Transp. Co., 286 Mass. 39, 189 N.E. 789;
E'Ying v. Chapman, 91 W.Va. 641, 114 S.E. 158;
Desoto v. United Auto Transp. Co., 128 Wash.
604, 223 P. 1050); also where attention was
diverted by warning signals placed on left side
of the road, and right side was also blocked, but
without warning signals. Miller v. Advance
Transp. Co., 7 Cir., 126 F. 2d 442. In accordance with the foregoing authorities, it was not
error for the lower court to refuse plaintiff's
requested instruction that defendant was as a
matter of law guilty of negligence. This matter
was properly left for the jury.'' (Italics added.)

.

,.,_,

From the foregoing review of the Utah cases, it
IS quite apparent that the doctrine of the Dalley case
has been eaten into to such an extent that it is no
longer the law of this state. This Court has never
let go unpassed, an opportunity to criticise the doctrine.
It has definitely refused to follow it, in the more recent
cases, which have come before the court. It is inconceivable that a doctrine which has received so much
judicial criticism and which has been found to be
so unrealistic and so wholly out of accord with modern
day driving ·conditions, should be permitted to stand,
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even nominally, as the law of this jurisdiction. It is
time now, that this Court, specifically and unequivocally reject the doctrine of that case or at least
so modify it as to make it comport to the realities
of modern vehicular travel.
The doctrine has been specifically rejected by the
. Courts of many of our sister states. Those courts
have pointed out many unsatisfactory factors of the
doctrine, in addition to those which have been judicially criticised by the members of this Court. For
example, see the case of Morehouse v. City of Everett
(Wash.), 252 Pac. 157, where the court said at page 160:
"The rule contended for is, in our opinion,
entirely too broad, and, if put in effect, would
have very serious and unjust results. It loses
sight of the fact that one driving at night,
has, at least, some right to assume that the
road ahead of him is safe for travel, unless
dangers therein are indicated by the presence
of red lights; it does not take into consideration the fact that visibility is different in different atmospheres, and that at one time an
object may appear to be 100 feet away, while
at another time it will seem to be but half
that distance; it fails to eonsider the honest
error of judgment common to all men, particularly in judging distances at night; it loses
sight of the fact that the law imposes the duty
on all autos traveling at night to carry a red
rear light and the duty on all persons who place
obstructions on the road to give warning by
red lights or otherwise; it fails to take into
consideration the glaring headlights of others
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and the density of the traffic and other like
things which may require the instant attention
of the driver; it does not take into consideration that a driver at night is looking for a red
light to warn him of danger, and not for a
dark and unlighted auto or other obstruction
in the road.
" (4) We believe that, generally speaking,
where the statutes or the decisions of the courts
require red lights as a warning of danger on
any object in the highway and such lights are
not present, it is a question for the jury to
determine whether the driver at night should
have seen the ·obstruction, notwithstanding the
absence of red lights. In this day when the
roads are crowded with automobiles, a red
light is at once recognized as a signal for danger
and therefore for cautious driving, but the absence of a red light, where the statutes or the
decisions of the court require them, amounts
to an implied invitation to travel the road in
the usual manner. In many portions of this
state, fogs are frequent-fogs so thick that the
driver of an automobile cannot, by means of
his headlights, clearly distinguish an object 5
feet in front of him. Must he stop on the road~
If so, all others must do the same, and thus
all traffic must cease. And in the process of
stopping and blocking the road, many collisions
must occur. A rule that will force this condition is a dangerous one and must do infinitely
more harm than good.
"To hold that one is, as a matter of law,
guilty of contributory negligence in not, under
all circumstances, seeing whatever his lights
may disclose, would be to practically nullify the
statutes which require red lights to ~be carried
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upon automobiles and to be placed upon obstructions in the streets or roads; or, at least,
to encourage travelers on the roads, or those
placing obstructions therein, not to comply with
the law in those respects, for, under the rule
contended for, a disobedience of the law with
regard to red lights would not entail any evil
consequences.''
The l\iorehouse case was followed in the. later
Washington case of Tierney v. Riggs, 252 Pac. 163,
where the Court said:
''The only question, therefore, is whether
the respondent himself was guilty of contributory negligence. The testimony shows that he
was driving it down Madison Street from the
Qast at a reasonable rate of speed, that as he
neared the appellant's car there was approaching a car from the west, and, in order to give
that car proper .passageway, he shifted from
his position in the street to1Yards the right,
which resulted in the collision. The theory upon
·which appellant predicates his claim of contributory negligence is that the respondent should
have been driving his car within the radius of
his lights, and that failure to do so constituted
negligence. But that doctrine has been recently
and finally repudiated by this court in the case
of Morehouse v. Everett, 252 P. 257, and in
that opinion prior decisions of this court, upon
which appellant relies, were referred to and
explained.
"In the Morehouse case, we call attention
to the fact that one driving a car at night is
warranted in assuming that the road ahead of
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hhn i~ safe for travel unless the dangers there
are indicated by red lights, and that the absence of warning gin•n by red lights amounts
to an iinplied invitation to travel the road in
the usual 1nanner; that to restrict a driver's
right by the •driYe within the radius of your
lights' rule would be to encourage the placing
of unlighted obstructions in the streets; and
the court finally, as already said, repudiated
that doctrine.
''The respondent's speed being reasonable
and his handling of his car being such as a
reasonably prudent man would indulge in, the
fact that on a down grade his lights did not
reveal the obstruction left in the street by the
appellant did not make him guilty of eontributory negligence in failing to see that object in
time to avoid it."
The doctrine has also been rejected by the California Courts. See Sawdey v. Ra.smussen (Cal. App.),
290 Pac. 684, where it is said (p. 686) :
''It is a serious thing for courts to endeavor

to establish al'lbitrary rules of safety, thereby
assuming, to a large extent, the functions of
the law making branch of government. The
question of public safety is always relative to
existing conditions. There are certain hazards
that must remain as a part of the daily routine, and while the minimizing of these hazards
is a goal to be earnestly sought, yet the elimination of hazard should be scientifically approached
and with care lest in avoiding the hazard means
of transportation be not rendered useless. To
establish an arbitrary rule, such as here conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tended for, might and would give obstacles to
traffic and dangers far greater than might ·he
reasonably anticipated. For instance, it would
bring all traffic down to the speed of that car
that would be obliged to travel at the slowest
speed in order to obey the rule. It would be an
incentive for all cars to equip with powerful
lights to the end that the radius of illumination might be enlarged or lengthened so as to
permit high speed, which excessive lighting
would be worse than total darkness as far as
safety of traffic would be involved. It would
serve as a defense and as an excuse for all
manner of traffic obstruction and would disturb and upset all prevailing traffic safeguards
by making the stop test the determining factor
in night driving.
''Our state is spending millions of dollars
in highway construction and in road maintenance, coupled with an adequate and efficient
highway patrol. Few accidents result from defective highways, and when a road or highway
is rendered unsafe or hazardous it is the rule
and custom that such dangers are sufficiently
guarded or marked as to insure little likelihood
of injury to the traveling public. Further, the
law required that any obstacle left in the road
at night or after dark have displayed warning
lights sufficient to be seen at a distance far
greater than the radius of any practicable headlight. With these safeguards already provided,
it seems so unnecessary to further undertake
to remove all hazards, at the risk of increasing
them.

* * * *
"We decline to hold that, as a matter of
law, it is negligence per se to fail to observe
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an unlighted object of the character here involved, under the conditions shown to have
existed in the instant case.
"Further, we cannot see the great importance
of plaintiff's ability or inability to stop within
a certain distance. For, as was said in Kendrick
v~ Kansas City (Mo. Sup.), 237 S.W. 1011, if
plaintiff had seen the truck and trailer there
would have been no need for him to stop, as
he could have passed it on the highway."
(Italics ours.)
See also the case of Sponable v. Thomas (Kan.),
33 Pac. (2d), Page 721, where the Court used this
language in rejecting the doctrine :
''To determine the question as a matter of
law, therefore, requires a consideration of the
evidence favorable to plaintiff, and that evidence
is that plaintiff, with car properly equipped
as to lights and brakes and able to see forward
some 30 feet or more, did not see defendant's
dark drab unpainted unlighted truck,. the body
of which stood high enough off the ground that
it was above the range of plaintiff's lights. In
a ·case involving the same issue as here, this
court said in McCoy v. Pittsburg Boiler Machine
Co., 124 Kan. 414, 417, 261 P. 30:
'' 'The purpose of a highway is for passage,
travel, traffic, transportation, and communication. The automobile is a vehicle used for travel,
traffic, transportation, and communication, and
the statute is regulatory of such use. Highways
are not maintained for the purpose of providing
places for storage of automobiles * * * ' Page
418 of 124 Kan., 261 P. 30, 31.
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''The subject of regulation by the statute
vvas movement of automobiles on highways, in
the sense indicated. A red light at the rear
end visible at night \Vas deemed essential. The
purpose w:as to provide a danger signal to ovei·taking traffic. 'rhe warning is more necessary
when the automobile is at rest, than when it is
in motion * * * '' Page 419 of 124 Kan., 261
P. 30, 32.
''The plaintiffs in proceeding along the highway had a right to believe that it was safe
and that there were no hidden undisclosed defects such as an unlighted truck standing in
the path of travel. \Vhile the facts are not the
same, in theory at least this case is controlled
by the reasoning of Barzen v. Kepler, 125 Kan.
648, 266 P. 69, and Deardorf v. Shell Petroleum
Corp., 136 Kan. 95, 12 P. (2d) 1103. Had the
truck in question been painted some contrasting
color or had the body of it been low enough
to be within the range of the headlights of
plaintiff's car, a different situation might be
before us, but, as we view the matter, the question of whether there was contributory negligence, on the part of the plaintiff in not seeing
the truck, under the evidence, was not a question of law, ,but was for the jury."
To the same effect is the later case of Long v.
American Employers' Ins. Co. (l{an.), 83 P. 2d 674.
The Oregon Court has likewise rejected the doctrine in the case of Murphy v. Hawthorne, 244 Pac.,
page 79. The Supreme Court of Oregon said:
"Appellant's principal contention, aside from
the question as to the proper measure of damages, is that we should hold as a matter of law
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that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to stop his automobile within
the range of his vision. \Vhile some courts have
announced a hard and fixed rule that it is
negligence to driYe an autmnobile at such ra.te
of speed that it cannot be stopped within the
range of the driver's vision [Citations omitted],
we think it improper to do so. Ea.ch case must
be considered in the light of its own peculiar
state of facts and circumstances. After all, the
test is, what would an ordinarily prudent person have done under the circumstances as they
then appeared to exist f Can we say that all
reasonable minds would reach the conclusion
that plaintiff failed to exercise due care to
avoid this collision~ We think not. Plaintiff
had a right to assume, in the absence of notice
to the contrary, that defendant would not put
this dusty, gray-colored truck on the highway
after dark without displaying a red light on the
rear thereof. If the truck had been lighted,
the jury might well have drawn the reasonable
inference that plaintiff would have been able to
avoid striking it. As stated in Haynes v. Doxie,
198 P. 39, 52 Cal. App. 133:
"Notwithstanding the facts stated, it may
be true if the truck had been lighted as
required by law, plaintiff would have been able
to see it, and would have seen it, while at a
distance great enough to enable him to stop his
automobile and avoid the collision.''

~also

"In H.allett v. Crowell, 122 N.E. 264, 232
Mass. 344, it was said:
'' 'The jury doubtless could find that the
plaintiff's motorcycle, lighted as required by
law, could be -stopped at the rate of speed he
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was going within a distance of 15 feet and that
he was about 25 yeet distant when he saw the
rear wheel of the defendant's unlighted farm
wagon. But the defendant was violating the
statute, and the jury could find that the plaintiff did not know the wagon was ahead until
he observed the glitter of his own headlight
upon the rim of the right outside rear wheel of
the wagon, when although driving at proper
speed and immediately turning to the left as
far as he could, he came into collision with the
* * * wheel * * * and was injured severely.
* * * It was therefore a pure question of fact
whether under all the circumstances he exercised the care of the ordinarily prudent traveler.'
''In Corcoran v. City of New York, 80 N.E.
660, 188 N.Y. 131-a case involving a similar
state of £act-we find this significant language:
·'' 'We are also of the opinion that the question of contributory negligence was one of fact
for the consideration of the jury. The automobile was going at the rate of 8 to 10 miles
an hour, and Noyes was shown to have been
an experienced and careful operator. Although
the testimony tends to show that this automobile, weighing 3,000 pounds, and going at the
rate of from 8 to 10 miles an hour, could have
stopped in from 18 to 20 feet, it is still a question of fact whether under the conditions which
existed the guard rail and fence were visible
from a sufficient distance to make such a stop
possible. It is true that one of the occupants
of the tonneau testified that the fence could
be distinguished at a distance of 15 feet, but
that is by no means conclusive, for the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of the legal prinSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ciple that a traveler on a city street has a right
to assume that all the parts thereof intended
for travel are safe, and he is not open to the
imputation of negligence if he fails to discern
an unkn<>wn and concealed danger at the very
instant necessary to prevent an impending
disaster.'
"While there is authority to the contrary,
we believe the better reasoned cases support
the holding that whether plaintiff failed to
exercise due care to avoid the collision was a
question of fact for the jury.''
The highly respected Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts has repeatedly held, in cases of this
sort, that the question of negligence or contributory
negligence (as the case may be), of the driver ''overdriving'' his lights is for the jury. In the case of
Langill v. First Nat'l Stores, !ncr (Mass), 11 N.E. 2d
593, following Jacobs v. Moniz, 228 Mass. 102, 192
N.E. 515, that Court said:
"We think it cannot be ruled as a matter
of law that where there is on the highway a
motor vehicle, the light on which is not so displayed as to be visible from the rear, a careful
driver of a motor vehicle is bound in all circumstances to see it in time to avoid it, and
must therefore be guilty of negligence if he
runs in to it.
"In the instant case the speed at which it
could be found the plaintiff was operating his
automobile :at the time of the accident was not
negligent in itself. Whether it was negligent
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in the light of all the other facts that the jury
could have found presented a question of fact
for their determination.''
The same principle was adhered to In the following later cases :
Baker v. Hemingway Bros. Interstate Trucking
Co. (Mass.), 12 N.E. 2d 95.
McGaffee v. P. B. Mutrie l\iotor Tr.ansp. Inc.
( l\Iass.), 42 N .E. 2d 841.
Bresnahan v. Proman (1\tiass.), 43 N.E. 2d 336.
In the last cited case the court said:
"If the plaintiff's evidence was believed, and
the circumstances of the accident were as he
testified them to be, the issue whether he w.as
contributorily negligent was one of fact. It
could not be ruled, as matter of law, that the
exercise of the care required him to see the
'dark only' sooner than he did. . . . He could
rely to some extent upon travelers obeying
the statute in regard to lights .and according
to common experience he could even reasonably
expect that a tail light would be visible farther
than the required 100 feet''.
Other cases to the same effect are :
Rozycki v. Yantic Grain & Products Co., 99 Conn.
711, 122 A. 717.
Pennington Produce Co. v. W onn (Tex. Civ.
App.), 49 S.W. 2d 482.
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Swift Y. :Jlichaelis (Tex. Civ. App.), 110 S.W.
2d 933.
\Vestern Development Corp. v. Simmons (Tex.
CiY. App.), 124 S.\V. 2d 415.
Gulf Brewing· Co. v. Goodwin (Tex . .Civ. App.),
135 S. \Y. 2d 812.
Chaffie v. Duclos (Vt.), 166 A. 2.
Jackson v. \V. A. Norris, Inc. (Wyo.), 93 P.
2d 498.
Olguin v. Thygeson (N.M.), 143 P. 2d 585.
The difficulties in cases of this sort were well
summed up by the Supreme Court of North Carolina
in the case of Thomas v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc.
(N.C.), 52 S.E. 2d 377. That court, like this court,
has nominally adhered to the ''assured clear distance''
rule, and like this Court, has found that such a rule
is unworkable and cannot be strictly applied in all
cases without working substantial hardship and Injustice. That Court, after stating the rule, said:
"Few tasks in trial law are more troublesome than that applying the rule suggested by
the foregoing quotations to the facts in particular cases. The difficulty is much enhanced by
a tendency of the bench and bar to regard it
as a rule of thumb rather than as an effort to
express in convenient formula for ready application to a recurring of actual situation the
basic principle that a person must exercise
ordinary care to avoid injury when he undertakes to drive a motor vehicle upon a public
highway at night. The rule was phrased to
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enforce the concept of the la~ that an injured
person ought not to be permitted to shift from
himself to another a loss resulting in part at
least from his o~n refusal or failure to see
that which is obvious. But it was not designed
to require infallibility of the nocturnal autoist,
or to preclude him from recovery of compensation for an injury occasioned by collision
with an unlighted obstruction ~hose presence
on the highway is not disclosed by his own headlights or by any other available lights. When
all is said, each case must be decided according
to its o~n peculiar state of facts. This is true
because the true and ultimate test is this: What
would .a reasonably prudent person have done
under circumstances as they presented themselves to the plaintiff"
C. EVEN IF THE DOCTRINE OF THE DALLEY CASE
IS STILL THE LAW OF THIS STATE, IT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

We invite the Court's attention to the fact that
the doctrine of the Dalley case has generally been
applied as against a plaintiff. who has failed to see
an obstruction on the high~ay and ~ho has collided
with the same and sustained personal injuries. In
those jurisdictions, ~here the doctrine prevails, it h;
held that the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence in failing to discover the peril and to avert
the same. There. would of course be no occasion tv
apply the doctrine if the plaintiff ~ere able to avert
the obstruction, by turning out or otherwise avoiding
the obstruction, other than by stopping. The im:portant
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thing would not be the inability to stop within the
distance illuminated by the headlights, but rather the
ability to avert the potential accident, either by stopping or changing course in the highway so as to avoid
a collision. The record in this case is clear that the
defendant maintained such control over his· automobile
as to be able to avert the peril presented by the obstruction on the highway, the Mitchell automobile. The
defendant was able to and did slow his car down and
drive around the obstructing vehicle and onto the
shoulder of the road, which was cleared for vehicular
traffic and where he had a right to drive. The defendant would have successfully averted the serious
consequences of this accident had not the plaintiff at
the last moment jumped directly into his path. It
would indeed be a harsh and unfair application of
the doctrine of the Dalley case to hold negligent as a
matter of law this defendant, who duly appreciated
all of the dangers, and who not only had to consider
the perilous position . of the plaintiff but also the
safety of himself and the five passengers in his automobile, .as well as any persons which might have been,
for all the defendant knew, in or to the north of
the :Mitchell automobile.

~·

{

Even if the defendant had been traveling at a
very high rate of speed, of which there is no evidence
in the record, we do not see how in justice or fairness he ·can be held responsible for the accident in
view of the fact that he was able to avert the obstruction in his pathway.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

46
It should be remembered too, that the plaintiff
stood at the side of the Mitchell automobile, waving
his arms to indicate his presence. This was undoubtedly
understood by the defendant and would logically and
reasonably be understood by any driver confronted
with the same situation on the highway, to mean an
indication on the part of the plaintiff that he was
then in a position of peril and to signal the driver to
go around. It is quite possible that the defendant
would have attempted to go around the front of the
Mitchell automobile even if he had been traveling so
slowly as to be able, without question, to stop. As
the plaintiff had indicated to him that he intended to
remain in his present position, there would have been
no real need or occasion for the defendant to have
stopped, and wait until the Mitchell car was removed
from his pathway or until the oncoming traffic from
the north had cleared. There was an avenue of travel
open to him over the cleared portion of the highway
and he was entitled to use it.
As pointed out in the case of J(endrick v. Kansas

City, 237 S.W. 1011, referred to in Sawdey v. Rasmussen, 290 Pac. 684, 688, there is no great importance
to be attached to the plaintiff's ability to stop within
a certain distance. So long as there is an open .avenue
of traffic around the obstructing object, there appears
to be no reason why the plaintiff should be required
to stop in the presence of the obstruction. All reasonable safety requirements are satisfied when the driver
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I,
i

47
chooses to proceed over an avenue of travel around
the obstructing object.
POINT II. EVEN IF THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN OVER-DRIVING HIS LIGHTS, SUCH NEGLI·
GENCE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.

Under Point I C, we have strongly urged upon
the Court the proposition that there is no duty to
stop when there is an opportunity to go around an
obstruction on the highway. Much of the argument
there stated is applicable with equal force to this
point. \Ye adopt it by reference without repeating
it here.
\Ve believe that it is clear from the record that
exces·sive speed upon the part of this defendant, was
not the cause of this accident. The record is far
from clear that the defendant was traveling at such
a rate of speed that he could not stop within the distance illuminated by his lights. He intentionally released his pressure on the brake pedal so as to get.
better traction for the purpose of steering over to
the side of the road. However, let it be conceded, for
purposes of this argument that defendant could not
stop within the distance illuminated by his lights. As
above pointed out, the defendant was traveling sufficiently slowly as to be able to avoid the obstruction
presented by the Mitchell vehicle. He successfully
~avoided injurious contact with the automobile and
would have averted the accident completely but for
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· the act ·of the plaintiff in jumping into his pathway
at the last possible moment. No matter how fast or
how slow the defendant might have been traveling,
he could certainly not be expected to avert an accident
where the injured party stepped directly into his
pathway, at a moment when it was too late to stop or
change the course of his direction.
We invite the attention of the Court to the case
of Grein v. Oordon (Pa.), 124 Atl. 737. The opinion
in that case is short and we set it forth here in full:
''In determining this appeal from the refusal to take off a nonsuit, we adopt the following excerpts from the opinion of the court
below:
'' 'While ascending a hill, and when near the
top, the engine of a car in which deceased
[mother of the minor plaintiffs] was riding
stalled, because of failure of the ignition system to operate; the brakes were applied and
the car brought to rest in the middle, or very
near the middle of the highway. ["It was a
much - traveled road.'' ''The car was not
dropped back to a place of safety, though it
could have been."] There was room for traffic
to pass on either side, and substantially the
same amount of room on each side. The lights
of the stalled ear went off. It was a bright
moonlight night. The deceased and another
young woman got out and walked up in front
of the car when it stopped, and had been
standing there about 10 minutes. The driver
a young man, remained in his seat and was
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trying to adjust the ignition and the fourth
member of the party, a young man, was standing on the left running board, giving the driver
assistance. Defendant's car approached from
the rear. His lights were burning. There is
no testimony that his speed was excessive and
none that would warrant a conclusion that he
did not give warning by sounding his horn.
He drove to the right of the stalled car. The
two young women started to the right side
of the road, the deceased leading, the other
a step or two behind. As the deceased was
stepping across the ditch at the side of the
road ["the ditch is really part of the road"] she
was struck by defendant's car and fatally injured. The surviving young woman says she
did not see defendant's car or lights until her
companion was struck; that, if they had looked,
they could have seen the approaching car. [She
testified they did not look for cars.]
'' 'Where a vehicle has stopped, and is
occupying the middle or substantially the middle of the highway, with sufficient space on
either side for other vehicles to pass safely,
a driver approaching fro.m the rear may make
use of the unoccupied portion of the roadway
on either side of the standing vehicle, exercising such care as the circumstances require.
If he passes to the right, he cannot be held
negligent as a matter of law for so doing.
If the driver of this car and its occupants
desired that vehicles should not pass to their
right, it was their duty to drop their car back
to the right side of the road, leaving the rem·ainder open for traffic. A standing vehicle
does not exclude traffic from any unoccupied
portion of the roadway that may be safely
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used. The defendant had no more reason to
expect that the young women would step from
the front of the car across the road to their
right than the driver of a car coming from the
opposite direction and passing on the other
side would have had to expect that they would
step from behind the car across the road to
their left. This is not a case of one vehicle
overtaken by another traveling at greater speed.
Without going into the question of contributory
negligence on the part of deceased, in our
judgment negligence on the part of defendant
was not shown.'
''We need add only that this is a clear case
of an unfortunate person suddenly stepping
out in front of a moving car; no other inference is reasonable from the established facts,
recited above. The facts stated in brackets
are taken from the record.
''The judgment is affirmed.''
In Shelley v. Waguespack (La.), 100 So. 417, the
plaintiff had jumped in front of the defendant's automobile when he was only eight to ten feet away.
In denying recovery, the court said:
"It is apparent from the foregoing statement of the testimony that there can be no
lia:bility attached to the defendant. The accident
on the defendant's part was unavoidable."

* * *
''There was no occasion for the defendant to stop his car before he was confronted
with the emergency. He saw the plaintiff standing motionless in a place of perfect safety
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with no indication that she intended to go upon
the street. He had every reason to believe
that the plaintiff saw his car approaching, and
he had the right to assume that she would
retain her place of safety until his car had
passed the crossing.
''There is no room for the application of
the principle of last clear chance. We have
seen that the defendant, after being suddenly
confronted with the danger of running into
the plaintiff, a danger which he did not and
could not foresee, did all that was in his power
to avert the collision, and all but succeeded.
'' \Vhile a person driving an automobile
is required to exercise the greatest caution
and prudence when passing street crossings
used by pedestrians, a like duty devolves upon
a pedestrian; and where, in a case like the
present one, the pedestrian attempts to effect
a crossing without exercising his senses of
sight and hearing, and is run into by an automobile, whose driver is without fault, and who
had no reason to anticipate the presence of
the pedestrian in the street, no liability can
possibly attach to the driver of the automobile."
In Goodson v. Schwandt (Mo.), 300 S.W. 795,
the court said :
"It is clear that at the instant Goodson
discovered he was in danger of being run over
by the third automobile he was out of the path
or course of the truck. He became confused,
suddenly jumped back toward the South, and
was instantly struck by the corner of the truck's
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mate cause of the collision and of his injuries.
We think the evidence for the plaintiff clearly
shows that the injury to her husband was purely
accidental and unavoidable by the defendant.
As said in Rollison v. Railed, 252 Mo. 525,
541, 160 s.w. 994, 999:

'To predicate negligence on two seconds
of time is in and of itself a monumental refinement. We cannot adjudicate negligence in such
pulse beats and hair splitting, such airy nothings of surmise.' " (Italics added.)
And on motion for rehearing the Court further
stated:
''As heretofore stated, it was distinctly
and definitely proved by plaintiff's witness
that while Goodson was out of the path and
to the left of defendamt's truck, he suddenly
jum'ped back and was struck by the left front
fender of the truck. This was the proximate
and sole cause of his death. There was no proof
offered to sustain any assignment of negligence;
in fact, plaintiff's evidence disproved all of
them. But if there had been proof to support
other averments of negligence, the fact that
Goodson suddenly jumped back and was struck
by the fender and so sustained injuries from
which he died defeated plaintiff's chance for
recovery," (Italics added.)
:See also Klink v. Bany (Ia.), 224 N.W. 540;
Faatz v. Sullivan, 199 Ia. 875, 200 N.W. 321.
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POINT III. THE ACCIDENT WAS SOLELY AND
PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE
PLAINTIFF OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE THERE WAS
EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE JURY COULD FIND THE
PLAINTIFF GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

It is the position of this defendant, that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law. Based primarily on this point, we moved for
a judgment of dismissal at the conclusion of the
plaintiff's case, and for a directed verdict at the
conclusion of the testimony in the case. We believe that it
is conclusive from the plaintiff's own testimony in this
case, that he failed to keep a proper or any lookout
whatsoever for traffic approaching from the south, that
he went upon the highway in light colored clothing,
which blended well with the light colored automobile
and the snowbank, which formed the background upon
which approaching drivers from the south would have
to discover him; that he failed to put out flares or
any other warning devices to warn approaching traffic of his presence on the highway and also of the
presence of the disabled vehicle; that he placed himself in a position of peril upon the highway, ·with
his back toward approaching traffic, when he could
have given instructions to Mitchell from a point of
safety at the side of the highway or at least from
the north side of the Mitchell vehicle, ,,~here he would
have been able to face oncoming traffic; and that he
jumped directly into the path of the :Maynard vehicle.
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We have set forth in our Statement of Facts, the
testimony of the plaintiff to the effect that when he
first discovered the approaching ~Iaynard vehicle,
that it was already off the highway. It must therefore
have been very close to him at the time it was first
discovered, since the evidence is undisputed that the
total distance it traveled off the paved portion of
the highway both before and after the point of impact
was 52 feet. It is likewise undisputed that there was
an unobstructed view to the south for a distance of
several hundred feet. The minimum distance estimated
from the Wright's garage to the north end of the curve
immediately to the south being 250 feet. Other witnesses
estimated it as high as 400 feet. The evidence is clear
that the curve was not a sharp one and it is reasonably inferable that cars on the curve should be visible
to a .person standing at the point where the plaintiff
stood, although the plaintiff would not be . visible.• to
such persons driving such cars by reason of the limited
distance illuminated by their headlights ·and the further
reason that they would not shine in the direction of
the plaintiff until after they had completely rounded
the curve. Assuming that the Maynard vehicle was
traveling at 30 miles per hour (approximately 45 feet
per second), it would have taken more than six seconds
to reach the point of impact after clearing the curve.
It would have been visible for several more seconds
during the time it was on the curve. Notwithstanding
this, the plaintiff £ailed to discover it until it was
almost upon him. He then did the worst thing he
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possibly could have done, that is, to run directly
into its pathway, although the car was then off the
paved portion of the highway and assumedly was not
traveling in a direction directly toward the Mitchell
automobile. He should have appreciated that by reason
of the light colored clothing he was wearing and the
light color of the Mitchell automobile and the snowy
background, that it would be extremely difficult for
drivers to detect his presence. Therefore, there would
be incumbent upon the plaintiff a duty to exercise a
very high degree of diligence to observe approaching
traffic and either to avoid the same or to give fiair
warning of his presence. The record is clear that
he did neither.
We believe that the plaintiff's own testimony
is such as to justify a holding of contributory negligence as a m:atter of law. We have no doubt, that
a jury would be entitled to find the plaintiff guilty
of contributory negligence for any or all of the
reasons above set forth. The Court committed prejudicial error of the grossest sort in holding as a
matter of law that the plaintiff was free of contributory negligence.

.... ·.

~~.'~

\Ve invite the attention of the Court. to the case
of Singer v. Messina (Pa.), 167 A. 583. In that case
a truck driver parked his truck, without lights, on
a highway, on a drizzly, foggy night. The highway
w·as wide enought to carry four trucks abreast. The
truck was parked in such a fashion that it extended
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diagonally to the center of the highway, thus obstructing all of the traffic in one direction. While standing
at the rear of the truck and hanging an unlighted
lantern thereon, he was struck by the defendant's
truck, and fatally injured. The defendant's truck
was being operated at such a speed that it could not
be stopped in a distance of less than 18 to 20 feet,
although his visibility was only ·6 to 8 feet in front
of the truck. The court held that the accident was
,proximately caused, not by the negligence of the defendant in overdriving his lights, but by the contributory negligence of the deceased in placing himself m
a position of peril without indicating his presence.
Said the Court:
"Appellant's contention, that the primary
negligence was that of defendant's driver in
proceeding at a speed which did not permit him
to stop within the distance covered by the range
of his lights, cannot prevail. The proximate
cause of the accident the causa sine qua non,
was the gross failure of duty on the part of
the deceased in parking his unlighted truck in
the unlawful manner he did and in placing himself in a p1osition of obvious danger at its rear
without indicating his or its presence by a warning
red signal light which might have given notice
to :the on-coming driver of the peril in front
of him." (Italics added.)
See also Sheely v. Ball (Ill. App.), 3 N.E. 2d 943.
That was an action for an injury to a helper on truck
which was being backed into a curb preparatory to
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unloading, on a busy thoroughfare In the nighttime.
The helper stepped in front of an approaching automobile which attempted to pass in front of the truck.
The court held that evidence f,ailed to show due care
on the part of the helper (plaintiff) and reversed a
verdict in his favor.
The court said:
''The evidence is not contradicted that on
the east side of the driveway, there were trees
and telephone poles and that the plaintiff by
taking 3 or 4 steps east could have put himself
in a place of safety. . . . Instead of going east
to a place of safety he ran west, the only way
that a car could pass around the truck in safety.
According to his own testimony, he ran directly
in front of the automobile ,as it approached
the south.''
:JI:

* * *

''This court is reluctant to set aside a
verdict of the jury on the ground that the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
After reading this record, we have come to
the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed
to prove that just before and at the time of
the accident in question, he was in the exercise
of due care and caution for his own safety.''
See also Shelley v. Waguespeck (La.), 100 So.
417; Pender v. Nat'l Convoy & Trucking Co., 206 N.C.
266, 173 S.E. 336; and Smith v. Joe's Sanitmry Market,
132 Me. 234, 169 A. 900.
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POINT IV. THE JURY COULD HAVE FOUND THAT
THIS WAS AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT, NOT CHARGEABLE TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF EITHER PARTY TO
THIS ACTION.

Without in any way waiving the arguments above
set forth, or conceding an infirmity in said arguments, we suggest that a jury might also have been
justified in finding that the accident here involved
was in that class of cases known as unavoidable accidents. Clearly the defendant did all that could be
done or reasonably could have been expected of him
to avoid the accident, after discovering the plaintiff's
position of peril. The jury might have found that
the plaintiff, confronted with sudden emergency, did
not act as an unreasonable man in darting to the east
side of the road upon discovering the approach of the
defendant's vehicle. In such event, neither party to
the accident would be guilty of any negligence and
the case would be one of unavoidable accident. In
such case the law of course, leaves the loss where it
falls and denies remedy to either party as against
the other.
See Klink v. Bany (Ia.), 224 N.W. 540.

SUMMARY
We believe the proposition is too well established,
too fundamental and too familiar to require any citation
of authorities, that in ruling on a motion for a directed
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ducible therefrom must be construed in the light
most favorable to the party against whom such motion
is directed. If there is any evidence in this record
from which a jury could reasonably find that the
defendant was not negligent; or that any negligence
on the part of the defendant was not the proximate
cause of the accident; or that the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence which was a causative factor in producing the accident; or if the jury could
find from all the evidence that the accident was
unavoidable, then the judgment of the district court
must be reversed and the case submitted to the jury
on its merits.
We are confident that the record adequately supports our contention that there is evidence on all of
these points to support a jury finding in favor of the
defendant. We take great comfort from the fact that
the verdict of the jury, being very small in amount, is
strongly indicative that the jury did not believe that
the plaintiff was entitled to recover in this case.
Though counsel for the plaintiff have argued to the
trial court that the jury was unduly sympathetic to
the defendant, we trust that this Court will not be
misled by any such assertion, which sounds strange
indeed, coming from the mouth of the plaintiff. It
is a fact well known to all practitioners and judges,
that the sympathies of the jury almost invariably run
to the party injured. This is a most normal, human
reaction. If the jury was in any wise sympathetic to
the defendant and antagonistic to the plaintiff, such
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,a feeling must have derived from the apparent lack
of candor on the part of the plaintiff and many of
the witnesses who testified on his behalf. The testimony of the plaintiff and his witnesses, was so contrary to the testimony of the defendant and the
passengers in his car and so contrary to the impartial
testimony of the .police officers who investigated the
accident, as to justify the jury in concluding that
the plaintiff and his witnesses committed perjury
at the trial of this case. One of the witnesses for
the plaintiff admitted to making an untrue statement,
and the testimony of others was in many respects so
inherently improbable as to defy credibility.
Particularly was this true with respect to the
testimony as to the icy condition of the roads. It is
a matter of common knowledge of which this .Court
may take judicial notice, that January, 1949, was the
coldest month in the history of Utah weather recording. The six people in the defendant's automobile, as
well as the two police officers who investigated the
accident all testified positively and unequivocally a~
to the icy condition of the road. The jury would have
been well justified in concluding that witnesses for
the plaintiff perjured themselves when they testified
that the road was not slippery.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence fails
to establish as a matter of law any negligence on the
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part of the defendant or that any negligence on the
part of the defendant eaused the injuries suffered
by the plaintiff. It is further submitted that the
evidence conclusively establishes contributory negligence upon the part of the plaintiff or at the very
least, that the evidence would support a finding of
contributory negligence by the jury. It is also submitted that the jury might have found that the accident
was unavoidable. The judgment of the trial court
should be reversed with direction to enter a judgment
in favor of the defendant, no cause of action, or in
the alternative to grant a new trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN
& CHRISTENSEN,

.Attorneys for Defendant.
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